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SUMMARY
Hungary has taken an FDI-oriented development path during its tran-
sition process. The economy has become highly internationalized and
largely controlled by foreign-owned firms, which have contributed
much by modernizing production, reorienting markets and transfer-
ring expertise. However, the initial surge of development seems to be
ending, at least in the form it took in the 1990s. Signs of saturation are
visible, and the question now is how to open a new chapter of FDI-
oriented development. Investment and operation will have to shift to-
wards more sophisticated activities. To effect such changes, Hungary
must offer enough qualified labour and an adequate infrastructure.
Moreover the investment incentive system needs overhauling, as entry
into the EU will outdate otherwise efficient incentives. Efforts must go
into organizing the economy according to the National Development
Plan, as a backbone for the EU assistance available.
5INTRODUCTION
Hungary was long seen as one of the most
successful transition economies in Central
Europe. The process was rapid and rela-
tively straightforward. The institutions of
a market economy were erected. Al-
though many economic structures from
the command economy had to be jetti-
soned, the destruction of capacity and
jobs was largely offset by impressive de-
velopment of new business structures.
New Hungarian-owned small and me-
dium-sized firms appeared in labour-
intensive industries, while deep restruc-
turing of manufacturing was carried out
mainly via foreign direct investment
(FDI). Indeed, FDI was decisive in re-
structuring the economy and moderniz-
ing manufacturing.
The very high level of FDI penetra-
tion in practically all important branches
of manufacturing occurred because the
country and its economy were highly at-
tractive and because of a series of suc-
cessful capital-attraction policies. Hun-
gary had an advantageous location in
Central Europe, sufficiently developed
infrastructure, and cheap, well-educated
labour.1 Privatization policy was aimed at
quick cash sales of state-owned firms,
mainly to foreign investors. Other en-
couragements to investment were a quite
generous system of tax holidays and the
                                                
1 See the frequently used motivation categories
developed by John Dunning.
option of establishing industrial free-
trade zones.2 These were coupled with
contributions from local government
authorities, which produced very favour-
able investment conditions in many loca-
tions. The stock of greenfield investment
also started to grow for the same reasons,
although this type of development was
very much concentrated geographically:
Buda-pest received most of the invest-
ment and sizeable amounts went to 4–5
other major industrial centres in the
North-East, but the remaining three
quarters of Hungary received very little.
The turn of the century brought
important changes in investment trends.
The inflow of FDI started to slow and
transfers of profits abroad began. Hun-
garian-based companies started to go in
for FDI, mainly in other transition
economies in the region. These three fac-
tors reduced the net positive FDI balance,
and in the first quarter of 2003, it be-
came negative for the first time since the
change of system. The years 2001 and
2002 were ones of general, worldwide
decline in FDI, following the terrorist at-
tacks of September 11. Although the
2002 decline in inward FDI was less
dramatic in the transition economies than
elsewhere, the Hungarian figures show a
number of important changes in the
composition of the FDI flows. These are
apparent in Table 1:
                                                
2 The incentive system of the 1990s is described
by Antalóczy and Sass (2003) and Éltető (1998)
6Inward FDI started to fall in the late
1990s, and a revival in 2001 was due to
intra-company loans rather than invest-
ment proper, but the stock of FDI contin-
ued to increase, as most firms were still
reinvesting most of their profits. There
was a change in the composition of the
increment in the FDI stock: net new
capital inflow was declining, while loans
and reinvested profits took the lead.3 Also,
the sectoral composition changed, with
services and trade taking over the first
place from manufacturing. Manufactur-
ing investments’ hesitation to launch new
projects in Hungary was very much evi-
dent, when Hungary did not receive any
of the new investments in car industry in
recent years.
With outflows of capital, a major,
but not dramatically increasing propor-
tion of profits were being withdrawn and
turnover in royalties and fees increased,
                                                
3 Unfortunately, the picture is further distorted by
a shortcoming in the statistical system. The data is
for net inflow and net outflow of FDI, so that it
contains the cumulative impact of investment and
disinvestment by non-resident owners of capital.
The quite low figure for 2002 therefore reflects a
significantly higher level of FDI inflow and a
capital outflow of several hundred million Euros,
due to closures in some labour-intensive activities.
as were loans. These cost items and loan
repayments started to play an important
role in the balance of payments. Both may
cover financial transactions rather than
normal commercial deals. The increasing
transfers and profit repatriation became,
from time to time, major contributors to
the deficit on the capital account, al-
though the increase in them also confirms
that Hungarian affiliates have been prof-
itable and therefore successful.
Chart 1 shows that various chan-
nels of investment-related capital outflow
played an important role in the later
1990s and early 2000s. Repatriation of
profits on portfolio investments was sub-
stantial throughout the 1990s and even
earlier. Open profit transfers on FDI
jumped in 1998 and continued to grow
more slowly thereafter, while net outflow
of payments on technical and business
services stabilized at some €600 million a
year.4  Outward FDI fluctuated. The jump
in 2000 was due to a major privatization-
                                                
4 The net outflow of technical payments is taken
here as a rough measure of hidden profit trans-
fers. The € 600 million negative balance is the
result of inward flows in the range of € 2000
million and of outward flows exceeding them.
Table 1
Inward and outward flows of FDI in Hungary
in 1995–2002
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Inward FDI balance (€ million) 3474 1815 1922 1815 1849 1835 2715 1073
Share of privatization in inward FDI (per cent) 75.7 31.2 69.6 25.1 17.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Outward FDI balance (€ million) 33 -2 389 428 237 603 368 272
Source: National Bank of Hungary (NBH) and State Asset Holding PLC.
7related deal in Slovakia that incorporated
the Hungarian affiliate of a large multi-
national company.
Analysis of the current account is
important for two reasons. (i) Changing
investment and income flows bring a re-
structuring that requires parallel changes
in other items in the account. (ii) A big
expectation of FDI in the 1990s no longer
applies: net FDI inflows no longer help to
stabilize the current account. On the
contrary, the reduction of nominal FDI
inflow and increasing outflow of incomes
and payments of FDI-related fees may
take the capital and income flows into
negative territory, as happened in the first
quarter of 2003.5  As for the strong out-
ward flow in technical and business fees,
                                                
5 Great caution is called for in combining figures
from different parts of the current account. Profit
and payment flows belong to the current account
and capital flows to the financial account. Despite
their different natures, they can be compared
from the somewhat mercantile angle of national
liquidity.
here hidden profit transfers are thought
to have been a factor, but the level and
intensity depended mainly on the needs of
global company networks. Transfer pric-
ing is widespread but the reasons for it
vary. Hidden profit repatriation used to
be the main suspect, but this can hardly
apply in Hungary. The main foreign firms
received tax holidays that gave them an
incentive to channel profits into, not out
of the country. Such inward transfers
were often seen when Hungarian affili-
ates of multinationals reported unexpect-
edly high rates of profit. Nonetheless, the
brackets of business services’ costs and
repaid loans were continually high,
which indicates a different rationale be-
hind these transactions.
Coming back to the issue of re-
structuring in the current account and
the changing role of FDI, the prime com-
parison should be between inward and
outward flows. Chart 2 shows income
flows from abroad and net inward FDI
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8levels. A comparison of this chart with
the previous one shows that both income
levels are significantly lower in the in-
ward direction. Thus the net result of
both inward and outward income flows is
negative. With portfolio-related incomes,
the net outflow is larger, but up to the
end of the 1990s, the net inflow of FDI
(the net balance of inward and outward
flows) showed a significant surplus,
which more than covered the net income
outflows. According to some theories of
the ‘natural path’ of FDI, the balancing
role will be taken over in time by the in-
creasing inward income flows. The cur-
rent FDI stock held by Hungarian resi-
dents abroad does not allow high levels of
income transfers, so that it will be some
time before the income inflows start to
perform such a function. The question
remains how the income gap can be
closed if net FDI inflow does not help.
Chart 3 relates the current account
to some important potential sources of
financing (changes in stocks of deposits
and portfolio, NBH reserves, net FDI in-
flow).
The columns in Chart 3 primarily
show that the negative and positive slopes
were roughly equal in each year. This
means that overall, the items investigated
offset each other and the slight surplus is
obviously due to factors not included
here. However, there are important shifts
in the structure, above all an alarming
increase in the deficit on the current ac-
count, caused primarily by a huge in-
crease in the trade balance. Income flows
did not change very dramatically. It is
also clear that the net inflow of FDI lost
momentum: consider the 1995 figure in
Table 1 or the entire 1992–6 period. The
third important observation is that both
the portfolio held by foreign residents
(mainly Hungarian state securities), and
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9the level of deposits show no clear ten-
dencies over time. They changed very
sensitively, sometimes in the same direc-
tion, but mainly in opposite directions,
seemingly dependent on monetary policy
measures and changes on world financial
markets. The real balancing role was
played by the change in reserves, which
is in fact its main purpose.
However, assuming a high current
account deficit in the long run and
changes in deposits and portfolio stock
not completely controlled by national
policies, the absence of a massive net in-
flow of FDI means that the balancing role
will have to be taken over by central bank
reserves. The conclusions are clear: re-
serves have to be kept at adequate levels
and an upswing of net FDI inflow has to
be achieved. This paper looks at the latter
option. It is an important task also be-
cause the previous high level of FDI in the
various branches of the Hungarian econ-
omy made FDI the prime source of future
development.
The changing patterns of capital
flows need some more analysis. Behind
them there are various possible determi-
nants that also bear important policy
relevance. These can be interpreted also
as the end of a first phase of investment
in Hungary, to be followed by one based
on different properties and so requiring
redefinition of important elements of
economic policy, including investment
promotion. The first chapter of the paper,
identifies the most important features of
capital attraction in Hungary in the
1990s and sees how they changed and
lost importance by the end of the decade.
The second chapter provides a more
thorough analysis of FDI-related capital
flows, and the third deals with some
long-term changes in the country’s capi-
Chart 3
Deficit financing source
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tal-attracting potential. The paper ends
with some policy conclusions.
1) CHANGING CAPITAL-
ATTRACTING FACTORS
The introductory description of the
changing structure of FDI inflows and
stock in Hungary indicates that there
must have been a shift in the country’s
attraction potential. The reserves of once-
successful attractive factors were ex-
hausted. Investors’ interest turned to
other investment targets. Under the con-
ditions that pertained, the capital-
absorption capacity of the country may
also have become saturated. The decline
on both the demand and supply sides is
interpreted here as an end of a period of
capital attraction. To revive the capital
inflows will require the establishment
and strengthening of new attraction fea-
tures. There are several arguments to
support this diagnosis.
Privatization is over. Up to the late
1990s, privatization in Hungary and
other transition economies such as the
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia pro-
vided investors interested in penetrating
markets or utilizing cheap labour with a
cheap way of expanding capacity. The
fluctuation of privatization revenues in
the four countries shows a close similarity
to the fluctuations in their FDI inflows.
This indicates that privatization was the
main driving force behind the FDI. The
privatization supply is also running out in
the other three countries mentioned, es-
pecially in manufacturing. Privatization,
as a main episode in the transition to
market economic structures, is over now.
Both market-seeking and effi-
ciency-seeking investors were able to find
plenty of opportunities to invest in Cen-
tral Europe in the last ten years. This they
did, and they are now present on these
markets to a sufficient extent. The in-
vestment market in Hungary is saturated.
New investors cannot ceaselessly appear.
Indeed, the worldwide process of con-
centration on various markets may deci-
mate the number of market players and
limit the number of potential investors.
Further expansion and investment can
therefore be expected mainly from in-
vestors already present on Central Euro-
pean markets. An increasing role will be
played by mergers and acquisitions. A
number of major acquisitions have al-
ready occurred among private firms in
Hungary. (These should be distinguished
from privatization deals, although they
too are acquisitions in a sense.) Mergers
and acquisitions were the big driving
force behind a sudden worldwide expan-
sion of FDI in the second half of the
1990s, and they dropped back most after
the great setback to global FDI flows in
2002. Compared with the decrease in
global FDI flows of two-thirds, the cur-
rent stagnation of FDI in the transition
economies is a fairly good performance.
Market saturation has been coupled
with rising labour costs. Real wages in-
creased more slowly than productivity in
Hungary in 1992–8, and in some years
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even declined, so that unit labour costs
decreased. In 1998–2000, pay levels
more or less stagnated, but in 2000–
2002, several government measures were
taken to increase pay and the minimum
wage. The result was an increase in real
wages of about 30 per cent, coupled with
a productivity increase of only 10 per
cent. Unit labour costs therefore in-
creased. Meanwhile other, rival transition
economies posted declines in unit labour
costs over the same period. Hungarian
wage costs may therefore have risen by as
much as 40 per cent compared with
neighbouring countries, especially if the
effect of continual currency appreciation
is added in. The negative effects of this
development affected labour-intensive
industries and tourism the most, but
capital-intensive, efficiency-seeking in-
vestments intended to exploit cheap un-
skilled labour were also hit. Their mar-
gins disappeared as well. Increasing unit
labour costs decayed the overall competi-
tive position of the country, not just in
labour-intensive activities.
A fourth, very effective attraction
factor in Hungary consisted of fiscal and
regulatory incentives. Long tax holidays
for corporate income tax were important
tools because they effectively turned
Hungary into a tax haven of global value.
The profits of global activity can be chan-
nelled to low tax locations, which was
especially important in Hungary, where
investors planned to carry out further in-
vestment and invest profits generated
elsewhere. Another important tool of this
kind was the establishment of industrial
free-trade zones, providing customs and
tax exemption not only for operational
purchases, but for fixed assets and in-
vestments, so that they provided an im-
portant long-term cost benefit. Both these
inducements were heavily criticized by
the EU in the accession negotiations. They
were then withdrawn, and no other pow-
erful incentive mechanism has yet taken
their place. An effective, EU-compatible
system of incentives is still lacking.
These changes in the main tools and
conditions for attracting capital have
produced a new investment environment
in Hungary, reflected in the current de-
cline in new investment. The reserves of
the previously effective attraction tools
have been exhausted. The inflow of FDI
will rise again if the Hungarian economy
can provide the conditions for more so-
phisticated economic activities. The crea-
tion of these needs to be the primary goal
of future economic policy.
2) CAPITAL FLOWS CONNECTED
WITH FDI
Much of the social cost of transition was
born by the central budget, which ran a
substantial primary deficit until the last
third of the 1990s. This was financed
partly from privatization revenues and so
from FDI. FDI also helped to improve the
balance of payments. The situation has
changed (i) because the acute budget
deficit problems were overcome (al-
though they re-emerged in 2002–3), and
(ii) because the net FDI inflow has dried
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up. Even if budgetary costs fall, the bal-
ance-of-payments aspect remains im-
portant, all the more because various
capital and income flows have gained
importance in the past few years. There
are three major flows to discuss: profit
repatriation, cost and loan transfers, and
outward FDI.
Owners of capital have an unlim-
ited right of free disposal of their taxed
profits. This is a basic rule of property
rights in a market economy, and applies
equally to domestic and foreign owners of
capital. Equal treatment is another im-
portant market economic principle,
which should apply also to the right of
profit disposal. Thus to restrict transfers
of earnings by foreign owners of capital is
a violation of basic market economic
principles. Such actions, like nationaliza-
tion, act as a deterrent to future invest-
ment. It is important, of course, to pro-
mote reinvestment of profits in Hungary
and the current tax system does so quite
efficiently. Up to now, major repatriation
of profits has occurred only when inves-
tors (institutional in the main) wanted to
plug losses elsewhere in their global
portfolio. The process is rather diverse,
for the Hungarian tax regulations attract
some profits from abroad. Nevertheless, it
is clear that substantial amounts of profit
have been transferred from Hungary
abroad since the late 1990s. This can be
interpreted mainly as positive: earlier in-
vestments have performed well and gen-
erate good earnings.
Another oft-cited sin committed by
multinationals is to use transfer pricing
and other tools to disguise and transfer
profits. Inter-company loans and inter-
company business services and royalties
are usually based on actual performance.
However, the price is set administratively,
and in many cases, there is insufficient
control over this or no suitable market
price to compare it with, so that the
prices paid are set arbitrarily, to suit the
purposes of capital needs or income
transfers. It can be inconvenient that local
governments have no proper overview of
economic events, capital flows or corpo-
rate behaviour in companies behaving in
this way. Economic policy-making be-
comes blunter if the reactions of firms to
measures cannot be accurately foreseen.
Such increasing unpredictability is a fea-
ture of globalization, along with the mo-
bility of firms and business. The author
believes there is a very wide range of
business rationales behind the hidden
business transactions carried out through
uncontrolled cost and loan schemes, and
profit repatriation to avoid taxes is only
one of them. Much more important, it
seems, is speculation. Certainly specula-
tive capital flows are sometimes several
orders of magnitude greater than profit
transfers, which makes them dangerous.
Such speculative tricks are less likely with
FDI, as fixed assets are by definition much
less flexible and convertible. Hungary is a
good example of false suspicions that
profit transfers may lie behind cost and
loan transactions. There have been sig-
nificant fluctuation in these transfers over
the last five years, despite of relative sta-
bility of the tax regime and exchange
rate, and of the Hungarian economy as a
13
whole. The rationale behind capital
movements is provided by the financial
requirements of the global corporate
network.
Outward FDI from Hungary also
has a negative effect on the balance of
payments, although it is usually treated as
a positive feature of the economy. Inter-
national expansion by Hungarian-based
firms is very much in line with all major
policy concepts and necessary from the
commercial point of view. There is some
discussion among analysts about the real
origins of the Hungarian ‘multinationals’.
Are major investors like the oil company
MOL, the telecom company MATÁV or the
savings bank OTP Hungarian firms or just
affiliates of other multinationals? The fact
of the matter is that there is foreign own-
ership in all three firms. There are also a
few Hungarian manufacturers with affili-
ates abroad. The question is important in
several ways. One is economic policy:
analysts suggest that ‘true Hungarian’
firms are more likely to respond posi-
tively to policies than other firms. An-
other aspect is the origin of the capital
invested abroad. If Hungarian firms in-
vest, they are likely to be using money
mainly raised in Hungary, although this
is not necessarily so. Foreign affiliates, on
the other hand, are likely to be using
funds originating with the parent com-
pany, so that they are not withdrawing
funds from local Hungarian investment..
On the other hand, even if Hungarian
money is being invested abroad, interna-
tional expansion and the process of be-
coming multinational are important and
inevitable constituents of a successful
competitive strategy. Companies must
grow in size to match the challenges of
bigger firms, or face being crowded out
even from their domestic markets.
3) FIRM CLOSURES AND FAILED
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
Changes in actual capital flows in Hun-
gary show there has been a change in the
investment environment. There have been
several cases of closures and failed in-
vestment projects, which also deliver
useful information on what has changed
in Hungary. The most important clo-
sures/withdrawals in the past year have
been IBM, Flextronics and Marc Shoe, all
of which moved to China. Two Hungar-
ian failures to attract investment from the
automotive sector occurred: VW pre-
ferred East Germany and Peugeot Slova-
kia. Careful analysis of these highlights
the main reasons for the problems and
their size and nature. The three factors
discussed are shifts in location advan-
tages, insufficient supply of crucial pro-
duction inputs, and a deteriorating
country image.
There has been a trend recently to-
wards closing down facilities in the Hun-
garian electronics, textile and apparel in-
dustries. Mexico had similar experiences
last year, as firms moved from Mexico to
China, just as they have from Hungary.
The divested activities were based on
temporary use of cheap unskilled labour:
the utilization and duration of the in-
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vestment depended on actual world mar-
ket conditions in this single production
factor. This is a particular type of effi-
ciency-seeking investment. There is no
sign of other types of investment leaving
Hungary or Mexico in large quantities.
The trigger in Hungary was the
steady increase in unit labour costs al-
ready described, coupled with the emer-
gence of China as a new low-cost invest-
ment location. The moves should not be
regarded as a failure on either side. The
investors were not intending to stay long
anyway, as is clear from their failure to
put down local supplier roots. Their ac-
tivity in Hungary was brief but mutually
beneficial. Hungary gained employment
for several thousand unskilled workers,
which was a big relief in a time of high
unemployment, and the extra budget
revenue from firms that were net taxpay-
ers, despite the tax concessions they en-
joyed. It was not really a failure for Hun-
garian government that these investors
did not integrate into the local economy
or remain in Hungary in the long term, as
those moves were not in the original in-
vestment scenario. Indeed, they would
have conflicted with it, by decreasing
flexibility through accumulation of sunk
costs. To some extent, there was spillover
for Hungary, as employees learnt from
the experience. The move was also pre-
dictable from the angle of the host econ-
omy. The end of the transition period and
approach of EU membership both pres-
aged an increase in real wages that would
be bad news for labour-intensive activi-
ties. The shift of location was speeded by
the opening of large low-cost countries in
Asia. In some ways, the trend can be re-
garded as a first step in upgrading Hun-
gary’s FDI capacities, with an increase in
the stock of investments employing skilled
labour as the next step. On the other
hand, Hungary still possesses substantial
reserves of unskilled labour whose em-
ployment or training remains a difficult
task.
It was also a shock for Hungary to
see the shrinking volume of investment in
Central Europe preferring locations other
than Hungary. In fact, Hungary has not
attracted any large new investment proj-
ects in the last five years. Even greenfield
investment unrelated to privatization has
occurred elsewhere in the region. The
absence of long-term investment in this
period cannot be explained by changes in
short-term conditions; cost structure or
exchange-rate problems are insufficient
to account for it. There has also been a
weakening of the country’s long-term
competitiveness in attracting capital. One
factor has been that the supply of quali-
fied labour in the country’s main FDI lo-
cations has diminished. It cannot be a
long-term solution to import such labour
from Slovakia, for it would be better em-
ployed at home. Peugeot, for instance, has
already made the necessary investments
there. The proposed ways of overcoming
this bottleneck have failed. Migration
within the country has not increased.
Training schemes for the unskilled have
not brought quick results, and the devel-
opment of infrastructure (especially
motorways) has been very slow and failed
to provided links between remaining
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pools of labour and Hungary’s FDI heart-
land.
There have also been disappointing
experiences due to the lack of competitive
local suppliers. A strong domestic pro-
duction background, with sizeable and
experienced firms ready to cooperate
with incoming investors, is a valuable
national asset. For various reasons, this
middle swath of Hungarian firms disap-
peared during the transition process. Lo-
cal business is still weak and inexperi-
enced, and its technical capabilities often
fail to meet the needs of up-to-date,
large-scale production. Its financial posi-
tion is usually weak as well. These defi-
ciencies in local firms increase the risks
for multinationals, making it a trouble-
some and slow process to develop local
linkages, even in cases where local-
content rules, for example, are impelling
foreign investors to increase them. One
factor in Peugeot’s decision to invest in
Slovakia was the existence of appropriate
supplier networks in its automotive sec-
tor, which had gained experience with
VW.
A third problem is that Hungary’s
image has deteriorated. This was favour-
able in the 1990s, when Hungary was
seen as a pioneer of the transition process
in Central Europe. But that image was
linked with the change of system, and
once the change was over, there re-
mained little to keep the country in the
centre of international interest. Other
countries were able to link their image
with major products or services, ‘lead
products’ with a worldwide reputation.
Hungary had no such lead products. On
the contrary, the economic structure
moved strongly towards component pro-
duction. The country image lost focus also
because government paid little attention
to keeping competitors at bay, concen-
trating only on attracting new invest-
ment. Many of the problems mentioned
did not ease over time. They affected ex-
isting investors, whose dissatisfaction sent
discouraging signals to other, potential
investors. This inherent policy problem
coincided with anti-FDI rhetoric during
the last election campaign, which many
investors found disturbing. They were
also disheartened by the protracted de-
bate with the EU over retrospective with-
drawal of tax concessions, which eroded
Hungary’s image as a firm supporter of
international investment. Thus the dete-
rioration in the ability to attract FDI has
been affected by both long and shorter-
term changes in Hungary’s image.
4) POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Hungary chose a new path of develop-
ment in the 1990s, hallmarked by the
predominant role given to FDI. The first
period of this FDI-based modernization
model has finished. Hungary has become
integrated into the international division
of labour at a level corresponding to its
available technical infrastructural and
human capabilities. The country’s re-
serves have not been utilized fully in
some respects. For example, engineering
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skills and experiences are still available,
and the uneven regional spread of in-
vestment has left some production inputs
of similar quality unexploited in many
parts of the country. However, saturation
of the country’s ability to absorb FDI and
growing competition from neighbouring
countries and other regions, along with
the global decline in FDI, mean that radi-
cal improvements in its current extent
and pattern cannot be expected. The
challenge is to open up new opportunities
and create the basis for a new, higher
level of integration into the international
system of labour division.
This new status calls for important
policy changes, which need to be the ba-
sis of the national development plan.
Unfortunately, the current national de-
velopment plan still focuses on matters
concerned with the current model and
lacks a vision of the country’s future. An
increase of Hungary’s role in the interna-
tional division of labour calls above all for
a regular pool of healthy, well-educated
labour. The education and health systems
need reorganization. Their performance
has deteriorated throughout the transi-
tion period, due to almost total neglect,
causing a sharp fall in the quality and
quantity of accessible labour. The new
stage of development requires skilled la-
bour that is flexible, creative, properly
trained in informatics, and experienced
in other sciences, whereas the education
system today produces clerical and man-
ual workers who are theoretically ori-
ented and have highly specialized (in-
flexible) skills. Knowledge of foreign lan-
guages is still a problem, although there
has been some improvement.
The tragic situation in the public
health services makes it hard to achieve
even simple reproduction of health stan-
dards in the labour force. The deteriora-
tion (e.g. exceptionally high mortality
rates among adult males) also results
from tough employment conditions. One
of the casualties of the political turmoil in
Hungary was the trade-union movement,
which leaves employees with no way of
effectively protecting their rights, in the
face of overall deterioration in conditions
and continual overloading by foreign and
domestic workplaces alike. In fact, weak
unions have been among the capital-
attracting factors. Similar trends can be
seen in many other countries, but they
place considerable strain on health. Sta-
bilizing this situation is an important task
of future development.
It is also important to create na-
tional lead products. Some attempts have
been made in this direction, but they fail
primarily for lack of financial support.
Campaigns to publicize Hungarian food
products have been run in many coun-
tries with limited success: the food sector
in general has been at a big disadvantage
due to massive subsidization of EU prod-
ucts. This may change with Hungary’s
membership, although there is still jeal-
ous protection: for seven more years,
there will be no equal treatment of cur-
rent and new members over agriculture
and foods. Still, in terms of its national
endowments, Hungary is poised to be an
important and efficient EU food producer.
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Another area of national strength
that could provide a core for future de-
velopment is informatics. This used to be
a rather successful field of science and
business in Hungary, and unusually, was
successfully promoted by successive gov-
ernments. Still in the 1980s, an important
programme was launched to supply even
elementary schools with personal com-
puters, and later with access to the Inter-
net. So there are already traditions of in-
formatics education in the country,
which have brought advances in infor-
mation sciences and in business applica-
tions. Informatics and especially software
development, could therefore be a focus
for future development. The fairly strong
position of informatics also provides a
promising starting point for a future-
oriented overhaul of the education system
itself.
There are a number of problems
that call for quick government action.
The capacity of the country to attract
capital needs to be restored, with innova-
tive incentives to replace the ones that
had to be lifted. Hungary has always as-
pired to be a fair and reliable partner that
does not seek to run counter to the letter
and spirit of agreements. It will therefore
be difficult to find opportunities for pro-
viding extra gains for investors, especially
financial ones. On the other hand, prac-
tice in Ireland, for example, shows that
the EU would tolerate the use of non-
compatible attraction methods for a
while, and when these were lifted, new
ones were ready for introduction. A
similarly flexible, innovative incentive
structure could still bestow important ad-
vantages on Hungary in various respects.
Unfortunately, there is no sign of such
innovation being attempted yet.
Stronger support of domestic entre-
preneurs will be necessary, to improve
the spread of spillover effects from FDI.
Local firms have to grow and develop to a
size, technical prowess and financial
strength that gives them a chance of de-
veloping regular business relations with
multinationals. The spread of spillover
effects should also be enhanced region-
ally. An important means of limiting re-
gional disparities is to develop the infra-
structure. Highway construction, for in-
stance, has proved a big attractant, and
makes countrywide pools of highly edu-
cated labour available to new investors.
These ambitious policy proposals
would all require investment on a scale
that. Hungary alone could hardly pay for.
The pace of modernization depends cru-
cially on two factors. The first is national
capital accumulation. This function has
also been weak in recent years, as post-
poned consumption soaked up earnings,
even in the case of entrepreneurs. Even
now, the decision-making range of Hun-
garian entrepreneur is no longer than
two or three years, due partly to the con-
tinuing high level of uncertainty. This
may improve as uncertainty declines. An-
other potential source of investment is EU
funding. The EU has been rather nig-
gardly over funding modernization in ac-
ceding countries. The entry of Spain,
Portugal, Greece and Ireland was sup-
ported by financial transfers larger by an
order of magnitude than those being of-
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fered to the transition economies. Never-
theless, a little is more than nothing, and
once members, newcomers may be better
able to bargain for stronger positions in
the next EU budget period, which is due
to start in 2007. In that case, EU transfers
may provide the backbone for the na-
tional development project envisaged
here.
* * * * *
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